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Abstract 
This study investigates the determining factors of international corporate sukuk pricing in the 
primary market for the period of 2004-2015. We present novel evidence for a unique data set 
covering all 63 international corporate sukuk issuances consisting of both a fixed margin 
rating as well a credit rating score. Our cross-sectional analysis indicates that both credit 
rating and maturity are significant factors which reduce issue spreads, whereas sukuk margin 
rating increases issue spreads.  More prominently, Shari’ah scholar reputation and the type of 
sukuk are not statistically significant factors in the explanation of the issue spread. Our results 
are comparable with determinants of conventional bond pricing, and our findings further 
confirm existing sukuk market practices. 
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1. Introduction 
Islamic finance is an ethically and religiously established alternative financial method aimed 
at supporting the real economy. The focal characteristic feature of Islamic finance lies in its 
compliance with Islamic legal or Shari’ah rules, which includes the prohibition of interest and 
gambling as well as speculation and excessive uncertainty and essentialising profit-and-loss 
sharing and risk sharing financing (Asutay, 2015). Even though, in a contemporary sense, 
Islamic finance has been present in the financial scene for the last forty years, it has made 
considerable progress during the last two decades. In addition, the trade-financing and real-
economy oriented Islamic finance industry has proved its reliability during the recent global 
financial crisis period.  
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As part of the successful growth trajectory, the total value of Islamic financial assets in global 
financial markets reached $1.814 trillion in 2014 (Thomson Reuters, 2015a). Despite such an 
unparalleled growth rate, the Islamic finance sector is still in a developmental stage with 
significant growth potential. It is projected that Islamic financial assets will reach $3.247 
trillion  2020 (Thomson Reuters, 2015a).  
Islamic banking and sukuk issuances are two of the most popular and widely accepted 
shari’ah compliant practices in the Islamic finance industry where Islamic banks are 
counterparts of conventional banks and sukuk provides the shari’ah compliant nature of 
conventional bonds. Sukuk, commonly known as Islamic bonds, is an investment certificate 
which is  complaint with Islamic law. AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions) (2010) defines sukuk as “certificates of equal value 
representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services, or the 
assets of particular projects or special investment activity”. In expanding, Godlewski et al. 
(2013) presented a detailed explanation on basic features of sukuk, categorisation of different 
sukuk types and historical developments in sukuk markets. There are basically three groups of 
sukuk: sale-based (murabahah), lease-based (ijarah) and equity-based (mudarabah, 
musharakah and wakala).  
In terms of trends in the Islamic capital markets, statistics indicate that total nominal value of 
outstanding sukuk issues in global financial markets reached $295 billion as of 2014. This 
implies that following Islamic banking, sukuk is the second largest financial asset in Islamic 
financial industry. It is expected that the total value of global sukuk outstanding will have 
reached $395 billion by the year of 2020 (Thomson Reuters, 2016). While the weakening in 
oil prices may have an adverse impact on Islamic capital markets, the indicators shows that so 
as to overcome the budget deficit the GCC countries may opt for sukuk in bringing their 
infrastructural development which is expected to provide further impetus for the expansion of 
the Islamic capital market. 
The aim of this study, hence, is to examine the determinants of the corporate sukuk spreads in 
international primary markets. We analysed a data set of 63 international corporate sukuk 
issued for the period of 2004-2015. We preferred to examine primary market spreads rather 
than that of secondary markets due to the low liquidity in the secondary corporate sukuk 
markets. Our cross-sectional analysis showed that, as it was expected, sukuk credit rating was 
the most important factor explaining the sukuk pricing at issue date. In addition to the credit 
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rating score, the maturity of sukuk issue as well as the size of sukuk issue are significant 
factors narrowing issue spreads, whereas sukuk margin rate increases issue spreads. More 
prominently, shari’ah scholar’s reputation and type of sukuk are not statistically significant 
factors in explaining the issue spread. Our results are similar to determinants of conventional 
bond pricing and these results also confirm sukuk market practices. Conversely, our findings 
regarding the reputation of shari’ah scholars contradicts those of Godlewscki et al. (2016). 
This paper continues as follow; Section 2 delivers a survey of the empirical studies in the 
field; while Section 3 explains our sample, data set and empirical methodology of analysis. 
Section 4 affords the results of our analysis and discussions. Section 5 concludes this study. 
2. Literature Survey 
Although sukuk markets are very vital for the development of the Islamic finance industry, the 
number of empirical studies analysing corporate sukuk issuances and pricing are 
comparatively limited. On the other hand, because corporate bond pricing is important for 
market players, related literature for conventional corporate bond pricing is very rich. 
Intuitively, the credit rating score of a corporate bond should be the most important factor 
affecting bond pricing. Nonetheless, some empirical studies, such as Elton et al. (2001, 2004), 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Chen et al. (2007) revealed that the 
credit risk is not the only factor explaining corporate bond pricing in secondary markets. It 
should be noted that in empirical studies, bond pricing is usually measured by the spread 
between corporate bond yield to maturity and treasury bond yield to maturity.  For instance, 
Elton et al. (2001, 2004) indicated that taxes, liquidity, maturity and other factors explaining 
risk premium for stocks are also significant for bond pricing. Rather than analysing the 
secondary corporate bond markets, Gabbi and Sironi (2005) discussed the importance of 
understanding determinants of corporate bond pricing in primary markets for all market 
participants emphasising that there are mainly two advantages of investigating corporate bond 
pricing behaviour that findings enable corporations to estimate cost of borrowing and they 
also indicate the role of credit rating agencies. In investigating factors affecting corporate 
bond pricing in primary Eurobond markets, Gabbi and Sironi (2005) found that credit ratings 
are the most important determinants of primary market spread. Moreover, Fridon and Garman 
(1998) examined the likely determinants of spreads for high-yield bonds in U.S. primary 
markets and conclude that credit rating is the most important factor for high-yield bond 
pricing and underwriter reputation can be a significant factor to narrow the spread. In line 
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with same methodology, Paiva and Savoia (2009) analysed possible variables which may 
affect corporate bond pricing in Brazil. They find that inflation, credit risk and maturity are 
significant factors in explaining corporate bond pricing in Brazil. 
Spread between corporate sukuk yield to maturity and treasury bond yield to maturity is a 
direct sign of credit risk. The expectation is that the higher the credit rating of sukuk is, the 
narrower the primary spread ought to be. Beyond credit risk is measured through credit rating 
scores, liquidity, tax-related variables, manager reputation, and macroeconomic variables 
which can all affect the spread. Unlike conventional corporate bonds, sukuk must be approved 
by a shari’ah board in terms of its shari’ah compliancy related to structure and contents at the 
date of issue. Along with previous factors, we questioned the role of Shari’ah board 
reputation and type of sukuk in primary market pricing.  
Most investors reflect religious motives in their decisions to invest in international corporate 
sukuk market. The shari’ah compliance of corporate sukuk issues is assured by shari’ah 
scholars and without such an assurance sukuk cannot be offered to the market. Investors can 
change their demand on the related sukuk issuance through examining the quality of the 
shari’ah compliance of the sukuk in question. For instance, if there is  doubt regarding the 
quality of shari’ah committee which approves sukuk issue, then investors may be reluctant to 
invest in this sukuk.  
In one of few empirical studies related to sukuk, Godlewski et al. (2013) examined the stock 
market reaction to sukuk issuance in Malaysia and find that stock market prices respond 
negatively to new sukuk issue news. Recently again Godlewski et al. (2016) have analysed 
stock market reaction to 131 sukuk issuances, from eight different countries, for the period 
2006-2013, by conducting an event study methodology. Godlewski et al. (2016) found that 
market reacts positively to announcement of sukuk issue in which highly reputable shari’ah 
scholars participated. Godlewski et al. (2016) found that the type of sukuk may also affect 
pricing in the primary market; as their result showed that market players might react 
negatively to equity-based sukuk issuance, but not to sale-based or lease-based sukuk 
issuances. They further found that the announcement of lease-based ijara sukuk issue 
increased firm value of the issuer. 
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3. Research Methodology, Sample and Data  
We collected the relevant data from two different sources; (a) Thomson Reuters Zawya 
database, and (b) Bloomberg database. Our sample consists of all international corporate 
sukuk issuances which have both fixed marginal rates and credit rating scores during the 
period of 2004-2015. In the Zawya database, there are 129 international corporate sukuk 
issuances during the sample period, but we eliminated 62 issuances due to floating marginal 
rate or data unavailability. We also dropped 4 outliers from the dataset. The origins of issuers 
are from nine countries; Bahrain, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and United States. 
Sukuk markets are still at their developing stages in most of the national markets and the 
number of corporate sukuk issuances is limited in most national bond markets, with the 
exception of Malaysia. Hence, we prefer to analyse international sukuk issuances rather than 
national issuances. In addition, we choose to examine the primary market data rather as 
opposed to the secondary market data due to the low liquidity in the secondary corporate 
sukuk markets. Another reason for using the primary market data is related to the up-to-date 
feature of credit rating scores around the issue date. As it is emphasised by Gabbi and Sironi 
(2005), corporations generally refresh their credit ratings just before the new bond issuance. 
Lastly, Gabbi and Sironi (2005) assert that primary markets spreads are better pricing 
indicators for borrowing instruments. 
The issue spread between corporate sukuk’s yield to maturity and a comparative treasury 
bond’s yield to maturity indicates which reflect the investors’ evaluation of several risk 
factors related to the issue. These risk factors are default risk, liquidity risk, primary market 
efficiency, tax features (Gabbi and Sironi, 2005) and Shari’ah compliance risk. Following 
Gabbi and Sironi’s (2005) methodology, we use the equation (1) to uncover possible factors 
affecting the international corporate sukuk spreads. 
!"#$%&' =∝ ++$,%-./' + 012-1&1/3' + 4%5' + 6,,171$873' + !ℎ%#1′%ℎ' + ;/ℎ$#<' + =' (1) 
where Spread is the dependent variable measuring the difference between each international 
corporate sukuk’s yield to maturity and the corresponding U.S. dollar treasury bond’s yield to 
maturity at an issue date for each sukuk issue, for instance; Spread is a sign of sukuk pricing 
and cost of borrowing for the issuer. Spreads are accessed through the Bloomberg database.  
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Following a related classification of Gabbi and Sironi (2005), we can group our independent 
variables into six basic categories of ‘Default’, ‘Liquidity’, ‘Tax’, ‘Efficiency’, ‘Shari’ah’ and 
‘Others’. The first group, ‘Default’, consists of four different variables that are: ‘Rating’, 
‘Senior’, ‘Financial’ and ‘Maturity’ variables. Rating indicates the credit rating score of each 
corporate sukuk issue, which is the main indicator of the default risk of a sukuk issue. We 
construct a credit rating score index as a continuous variable by using Moody’s, Standard and 
Poors as well as Fitch credit ratings on each sukuk. Credit rating scales and our credit rating 
index are reported in Appendix 1. If there are more than one rating score for a sukuk issuance, 
we calculate the mean value of all scores. We expect a negative relationship between Spread 
and Rating that Spread should decline as rating scores increase. Senior measures whether a 
sukuk issuance is a senior or subordinated issuance. In the case of default, senior debtholders 
are given priority for the payment and then thereafter subordinated debtholders are paid. A 
dummy variable for ‘Senior’ is introduced: 1 if the sukuk issue is Senior, 0 otherwise. We 
expect a negative coefficient for this dummy variable, because subordinated debtholders will 
demand higher yield to maturity in comparison to senior debt holders. ‘Financial’ is another 
dummy variable which is 1, if the issuer is a financial sector firm, 0 otherwise. Since most 
governments guarantee the debts of financial firms to ensure stability in financial markets, the 
sign of this variable’s coefficient may be negative. Maturity is defined as the time to reach 
maturity of each sukuk in terms of the year. We expect that longer maturity leads to higher 
spread due to higher uncertainity in longer periods. 
Along with default risk, there are other factors which may affect sukuk pricing as discussed by 
Elton et al. (2003). The second group of independent variables represents liquidity risk in the 
secondary market of sukuk and there is only one variable in this group, namely; ‘liquidity’. 
‘Amount’ is the only variable measuring the nominal value of international corporate sukuk 
issuance as natural logarithm. We assume that larger corporate sukuk issuances will have 
higher liquidity in the secondary market. 
The third group consists of the only tax-related variable ‘margin’, which measures the annual 
marginal rate of each international corporate sukuk. Elton et al. (2003) stated that capital gains 
are taxed at sales dated while coupons are taxed at the date of coupon payments. In other 
words, bonds which have lower coupon rates are more valuable due to postponed tax 
payments (tax timing advantage). Similar to bonds, sukuk with higher margin rates might lead 
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to higher tax burden for investors. Contingent on this reasoning, we expected a positive 
coefficient for this variable. 
Another group of independent variables, ‘efficiency’, represents primary sukuk market 
efficiency. This group contains variables representing the quality and number of advisors 
which participate in sukuk issuances in addition to listing in exchanges as well. ‘Manager 
Reputation’ designates the total market power of all managers which take part in each 
corresponding sukuk issuance. Advisors comprises lead managers, co-managers and book 
runners. For this, initially, we construct a reputation index for each manager in international 
corporate sukuk market by dividing nominal value of sukuk issuances managed by each 
manager to total nominal value of all international corporate sukuk issuances during the 
sample period (this reputation index is a based on a value-based league table). Subsequently, 
we sum reputation indices of all advisors in each sukuk issuance so that we calculate a 
manager reputation score for each sukuk issuance. Higher manager reputation allows higher 
demand (investors) for the managed corporate sukuk issue so that issue spread is weakened. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between issue spread and manager reputation. 
Alternative measure for primary sukuk market efficiency is ‘Manager Number’, which is an 
indicator for the total number of advisors taking part in the issuance of sukuk. In conclusion, 
we used ‘Private’ variable which indicated whether sukuk issue takes place in an exchange or 
not. If sukuk issue is listed in an exchange, this dummy variable is 1; if the issue is private and 
not listed in any exchange, this dummy variable is 0. 
Unlike conventional bond issuances, as previously mentioned, sukuk issuers have to assure 
that sukuk structure is in compliance with shari’ah rules. For this, Shari’ah scholars act as 
assurance service providers so that investors can meet the religious criteria to confidently 
invest in these financial instruments. Consequently, the quality of shari’ah compliance 
services might affect investor behaviour and, therefore, pricing of sukuk. To measure the 
quality of shari’ah compliance of each sukuk issue we use ‘Shari’ah Reputation’ variable, 
which denotes the total market power of the shari’ah scholars who provide shari’ah 
compliance assurance services related to the corresponding sukuk issuance. In the definition 
and estimation of this variable, individual scholars are considered rather than shari’ah 
board/committee of institutions. For this, firstly, we constructed a reputation index for each 
shari’ah scholar in international corporate sukuk market by dividing nominal value of sukuk 
issuances approved by each scholar to total nominal value of all international corporate sukuk 
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issuances during the sample period (this reputation index is like a value-based league table). 
Subsequently, we summed the reputation indices of all scholars participated in each sukuk 
issue so that we calculate a shari’ah reputation score for each sukuk issue. If investors 
considered the quality of shari’ah compliance in their investment decisions, they could 
increase their demand on sukuk issuances with high shari’ah reputation. Therefore, higher 
demand might lead to a narrow spread. Alternative measure for the quality of shari’ah 
compliance is ‘Shari’ah Scholar Number’ and this variable stands for the total number of 
scholars taking part in each sukuk issuance.  
Over and above preceding independent variables, we add other control variables to our 
empirical model. Since the structure of sukuk might affect pricing, consequently, we use 
‘Type’ dummy variables for three different sukuk structures, sale-based sukuk (murabahah), 
lease-based sukuk (ijarah) and equity-based sukuk (mudarabah, musharaka and wakala). 
Type dummy variable is 1 if issuance is structured as corresponding sukuk type, 0 otherwise. 
‘VIX’, as a variable, stands for volatility index of the U.S. equity markets and this variable is 
used to measure the volatility in the financial markets at the date of sukuk issuance. ‘Political 
Risk’ is an additional control variable measuring institutional and political factors across 
different countries.  We use political risk points of International Country Risk Guide prepared 
by the PRS Group, which are corresponding points at the month of individual sukuk issued. 
Table 1 presents an overall summary statistics for our sample, while Table 2 presents 
summary statistics by year and country. As can be seen, the average issue size is USD564.3 
million; average issue spread is 301.2 basis points; average maturity is 6.7 years; average 
margin rate is 4.7% and median rating index is 0.714 which equals to credit rating scale of 
A3, A- and A-. The majority of the sukuk is structured as senior, while 34 of issuers operate in 
financial sector whereas 29 of them are industrial firms. Moreover, as the results depict, 39 of 
sukuk issuances are organised as equity-based; 20 of them are structured as lease-based and 
only 4 of them are structured as sale-based.  
It should be noted that despite covering 2004-2015 period and nine countries; due to 
availability of data our observations are concentrated in the period after the financial crisis 
period (2011-2015), and motivated mostly towards four countries, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey and United Arab Emirates. In terms of estimation method, this cross-sectional model 
is projected with ordinary least squares method. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
    
Default Liquidity Tax Efficiency Type of Sukuk 
    
  Spread VIX Political 
  (Basis  Volatility Risk 
  Points) Rating Senior Financial Maturity Amount Margin Manager Manager Shari’ah Shari’ah Private Equity- Lease- Sale- Index Score 
    (Index) (Dummy) (Dummy) (Year) (Million  (%) Reputation Number Reputation Scholar (Dummy) Based Based Based     
            USD)   (Index)   (Index) Number   (Dummy) (Dummy) Dummy)     
                                    
Mean 301.2 0.698 0.952 0.540 6.7 564.3 4.7 1.223 1.8 5.484 5.8 0.079 0.619 0.317 0.063 17.0 72.7 
Median 245.0 0.714 1 1 5.0 500.0 4.3 1.145 1.5 5.000 5.0 0 1 0 0 15.4 76.5 
Minimum 68.2 0.333 0 0 3.0 20.0 2.1 0.005 0.0 1.000 1.0 0 0 0 0 10.6 52.5 
Maximum 970.4 1.167 1 1 30.0 1,500 12.0 2.560 5.8 15.000 24.0 1 1 1 1 33.5 88.5 
Stand. Dev. 181.0 0.163 0.215 0.502 4.7 319.7 1.8 0.621 1.3 2.671 4.5 0.272 0.490 0.469 0.246 5.3 8.3 
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
N for 1 - - 60 34 - - - - - - - 58 39 20 4 - - 
N for 0 - - 3 29 - - - - - - - 5 24 43 59 - - 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics (by year and country) 
    Mean 
Year Number  Spread  Rating  Amount  Margin  Maturity  Manager  Shari'a  VIX Political 
  of  (Basis  (Index) (Million  (%) (Year) Reputation  Scholar   Index Risk 
  Sukuk Points)   USD)     (Index) Reputation    Score 
                (Index)     
2004 1 250.0 0.571 100.0 4.6 5.0 0.116 1.215 14.9 77.5 
2007 3 339.1 0.730 876.7 6.4 7.3 0.599 0.826 17.6 77.5 
2008 1 170.0 0.762 300.0 5.7 5.0 0.159 0.793 29.0 79.0 
2009 1 175.0 0.929 500.0 6.2 5.0 0.405 1.396 24.7 83.0 
2010 3 306.1 0.706 533.3 5.9 4.3 1.042 1.497 22.5 69.5 
2011 7 323.4 0.712 485.7 6.2 5.1 1.468 2.379 24.6 74.8 
2012 12 308.5 0.728 595.8 6.3 5.7 1.458 1.797 18.5 74.3 
2013 14 363.7 0.624 569.3 6.0 8.1 1.083 2.135 13.6 71.3 
2014 12 322.3 0.622 565.8 6.1 7.9 1.195 1.795 13.0 69.5 
2015 9 168.5 0.832 568.1 6.3 6.3 1.574 1.725 15.9 72.2 
Total 63 301.2 0.698 564.3 6.1 6.7 1.223 1.834 17.0 72.7 
                      
    Mean 
Country Number  Spread  Rating  Amount  Margin  Maturity  Manager  Shari'a  VIX Political 
  of  (Basis  (Index) (Million  (%) (Year) Reputation  Scholar   Index Risk 
  Sukuk Points)   USD)     (Index) Reputation    Score 
                (Index)     
Bahrain 1 536.1 0.571 130.0 4.9 7.0 0.079 0.895 19.0 73.5 
Indonesia 1 447.7 0.571 500.0 6.2 5.0 1.859 2.639 13.7 55.0 
Luxembourg 2 622.1 0.619 30.0 3.3 5.0 0.005 0.754 16.6 88.3 
Malaysia 4 120.8 0.810 325.0 5.7 6.7 1.124 3.312 16.8 71.5 
Qatar 5 192.7 0.792 840.0 6.7 5.0 1.260 2.034 16.8 72.8 
SA 11 272.2 0.741 786.4 6.5 10.7 0.941 1.734 14.5 67.2 
Turkey 7 424.7 0.544 357.1 5.8 5.4 1.100 1.778 17.3 55.3 
UAE 30 302.2 0.692 573.8 6.2 6.0 1.492 1.745 17.9 77.8 
US 2 132.5 0.846 500.0 3.4 5.0 0.740 1.598 18.7 81.3 
Total 63 301.2 0.698 564.3 6.1 6.7 1.223 1.834 17.0 72.7 
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4. Analysis and Results 
Table 3 reports estimation results of cross-sectional model explained in the preceeding 
section. We estimated two different models; model 1 includes the manager reputation index 
and shari’ah reputation, while model 2 includes manager number in addition to the Shari’ah 
scholar number. 
Table 3: Estimation Results of Linear OLS Cross-sectional Models  
i i i i i i i iSpread Default Liquidity Tax Efficiency Sharia Other=a+ + + + + + +e  
Dependent Variable: Spread Model 1   Model 2 
Default Variables       
 Rating -210.1**   -234.0** 
  (-2.15)   (-2.36) 
 Senior Dummy Variable 26.2   26.6 
  (0.54)   (0.55) 
 Financial Dummy Variable 5.5   7.0 
  (0.21)   (0.26) 
 Maturity -6.1**   -6.1** 
  (-2.37)   (-2.30) 
Liquidity Variables       
 Amount -34.1*   -29.4 
  (-1.81)   (-1.59) 
Tax Variables       
 Margin 74.6***   70.4*** 
  (8.21)   (7.58) 
Efficiency Variables       
 Manager Reputation 33.1     
  (1.46)     
 Manager Number     4.8 
      (1.03) 
 Private Dummy Variable -68.9   -68.4 
  -(1.53)   -(1.50) 
Sharia Variables       
 Shari'a Reputation 0.3     
  (0.03)     
 Shari'a Scholar Number     -1.6 
      -(0.64) 
Other Variables       
 Sale-based Dummy Variable -2.8   2.6 
  -(0.06)   0.05 
 Leased-based Dummy Variable 0.1   12.0 
  (0.00)   0.24 
 Equity-based Dummy Variable       
        
 VIX Volatility Index -0.2   -0.505 
  -(0.11)   -0.210 
 Political Risk Score -0.8   -0.739 
  -(0.61)   -0.540 
 Constant 349.7*   371.1* 
  (1.91)   (1.96) 
    
R2 0.855   0.852 
Adjusted R2 0.817   0.812 
F statistics 22.3***   21.6*** 
N 63   63 
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Notes: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. Mean Variance Inflation Factors are below 5. Residuals are normally distributed and 
have homoscedastic variance. 
 
The coefficients of Rating variable are negatively and statistically significant at a 5% level in 
two models representing an inverse relationship between the issue spread and the credit rating 
score. Since we recognised that sukuk issue spreads a reduction as credit rating scores are 
higher, the result is in line with our expectation. The coefficient of Maturity moreover 
indicates a statistically significant negative relationship between the issue spread and maturity 
of sukuk. This suggests that sukuk with longer maturity tend to have higher issue spreads in 
the primary markets. As the findings show, other default related variables, namely senior and 
financial dummy variables, do not have statistically significant coefficients. 
Proxy variable for the liquidity, namely amount, has negative coefficients in two models, but 
merely the coefficient of model 1 is statistically significant at the 10% level. These results 
indicate restricted evidence that the size of sukuk issue have a positive effect on pricing. In 
other words, sukuk spreads a decrease as a nominal value of sukuk issue increases. Elton et 
al.’s (2003) finding is in line with this result; as they likewise did not find any significant 
impact of bond value outstanding and bond pricing. 
The only tax-related variable which has statistically significant positive coefficients in all 
models is the Margin indicating that investors favour sukuk issued at lower margin rates as a 
result of the additional tax burden. This is due to the fact that investors demand higher 
revenue to compensate for the tax disadvantage regarding sukuk with higher annual marginal 
payments. 
When we scrutinise the coefficients of variables concerning primary Market Efficiency, we 
find no statistically significant relationship between the issue spread and variables of 
efficiency. In other words, as can be seen in the results of all models Manager Reputation, 
Manager Number and Private Issuance do not account for the  cross-sectional variation in 
sukuk spreads. 
Explanatory variables regarding Shari’ah compliance risk, Shari'ah Reputation, as well as the 
Shari'ah Scholar Number, are not statistically significant in either of the two models, which 
further indicates that investors do not consider the quality of the Shari’ah committee in their 
decisions to demand sukuk. Consequently, there is no relationship between sukuk spreads and 
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the Shari’ah reputation index/Shari’ah scholar number. It should be noted that our findings in 
this section are incongruent with Godlewski et al. (2016), as they, on the contrary, found a 
statistically significant positive relationship between the reaction of stock market price to 
sukuk issue and shari’ah scholar reputation.  
Other sukuk-related independent variables relate to the structure or type of sukuk: Sale-based 
sukuk, lease-based sukuk and equity-based sukuk dummy variables. One of these dummy 
variables is omitted in each model due to collinearity. Nevertheless, as the results demonstrate 
none of these dummy variables are statistically significant in either of the models. These 
findings may imply that the sukuk structure does not affect the pricing of sukuk, or since the 
credit rating methodology may have already considered of a type of sukuk, the structure may 
not be a significant determinant.  
Finally, as the results in Table 3 depicts, both volatility index and political risk scores of 
regarding countries are included in model 1 and 2, are not statistically significant. 
5. Conclusion 
This study presented one of the few empirical studies on the corporate sukuk market, in which 
an attempt was made to identify important factors influencing  the international corporate 
sukuk spreads. We have analysed cross-sectional observations of 63 international corporate 
sukuk issuances, from 9 different countries, over the period of 2004-2015. The results show 
that the credit rating score, size of the sukuk issue, as well as the annual margin rate on sukuk 
are statistically significant factors explaining the cross-sectional variations in corporate sukuk 
spreads. In contrast, sukuk specific factors such as quality of shari’ah compliance, and the 
type of sukuk does not bear any significant effect on issue spreads. 
We can, consequently, conclude that determining factors of sukuk issuance spreads are similar 
to those of conventional bond issue spreads. As we predicted, corporations with higher credit 
risks have to bear higher borrowing costs in international corporate sukuk markets. Our results 
are congruent with results of a recent survey (by Thomson Reuters, 2015b: 49), which was 
completed by market participants; it also found that the sukuk rating, the type of issuer, as 
well as global market stability are the most significant factors affecting the pricing of sukuk 
issuance spreads. 
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More prominently, the findings imply that investors do not consider the quality of shari’ah 
scholars participating with regards to the sukuk issue. There are two conceivable explanations 
for this finding. Firstly, the concentration rate among shari’ah scholars in international 
corporate sukuk issuance numbers is so high that a few scholars contribute in almost all sukuk 
issuances due to the limited number of reputable shari’ah scholars. If investors purely 
deliberate on these top-rated scholars by disregarding other scholars on quality of shari’ah 
compliance, there will be no variation among shari’ah scholar reputation indices of sukuk 
issuances, which makes the coefficient of this variable insignificant. The second possibility is 
that investors merely consider whether there is a shari’ah board/committee or not, and they 
do not consider the reputation of specific scholars in the board. Therefore, the rational 
behaviour of individual sukuk holders can explain these results, as religious investors would 
accept ‘a Shari’ah compliant sukuk’ irrespective of a particular Shari’ah scholar. Such an 
attitude is identified by Vogel and Hayes (1998: 27, footnote) in describing the nature of 
demand for Islamic finance as “socially and politically conservative, seeking individual piety 
and social mores built around traditionalist compliance with fiqh…”. Thus, as long as fiqhi 
rationale or Shari’ah compliance is delivered, by whom it is provided may not be an essential 
issue for the demand side in Islamic finance. This is due to the fact that the Shari’ah 
legitimacy imposed by Shari’ah scholars creates a hegemony which may not allow the 
reputation to be questioned. As for the international investors, for them the most important 
factor would be the quantitative screening and potential returns, as they may not be 
particularly concerned with Shari’ah compliancy process nor with the Shari’ah scholar 
involved in the process; of course, they would also consider the impact of reputation risk on 
the return of the sukuk issuance. 
In conclusion, the examining and analysing of factors affecting the primary sukuk market 
pricing should be of interest for corporations issuing sukuk in international markets.  The 
main implication is that companies can lower their cost of borrowing by changing firm-
specific and sukuk-specific factors. 
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Appendix 1. Rating Scales of 3 Rating Agencies 
Moody's Standard & Poor's Fitch 
Rating  
Scale 
Rating 
Index 
Rating  
Scale 
Rating  
Index 
Rating  
Scale 
Rating  
Index 
Aaa 1.000 AAA 1.000 AAA 1.000 
Aa1 0.952 AA+ 0.952 AA+ 0.952 
Aa2 0.905 AA 0.905 AA 0.905 
Aa3 0.857 AA- 0.857 AA- 0.857 
A1 0.810 A+ 0.810 A+ 0.810 
A2 0.762 A 0.762 A 0.762 
A3 0.714 A- 0.714 A- 0.714 
Baa1 0.667 BBB+ 0.667 BBB+ 0.667 
Baa2 0.619 BBB 0.619 BBB 0.619 
Baa3 0.571 BBB- 0.571 BBB- 0.571 
Ba1 0.524 BB+ 0.524 BB+ 0.524 
Ba2 0.476 BB 0.476 BB 0.476 
Ba3 0.429 BB- 0.429 BB- 0.429 
B1 0.381 B+ 0.381 B+ 0.381 
B2 0.333 B 0.333 B 0.333 
B3 0.286 B- 0.286 B- 0.286 
Caa1 0.238 CCC+ 0.238 CCC+ 0.238 
Caa2 0.190 CCC 0.190 CCC 0.190 
Caa3 0.143 CCC- 0.143 CCC- 0.143 
Ca 0.095 CC 0.095 CC 0.095 
C 0.048 C 0.048 C 0.048 
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